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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
' 
JEAN SINCLAIR, 
Plaintif £-Respondent, 
vs. 
Defendant-Appellant . .J 
Case No. 
9971 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAS MADE UNSUPPORTED CON-
CLUSIONS NOT BASED IN ANY WAY ON THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OR LOGICAL INFER-
ENCES THEREFROM UPON WHICH THE DECISION 
WAS BASED, CREATING THE INESCAPABLE CON-
CLUSION THAT THE OPINION WAS NOT BASED 
UPON THE RECORD BY WHICH THE COURT IS 
BOUND. 
A careful review of the entire record, both 
briefs, and the decision of the Court reveals the fol-
lowing discrepancies: 
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(a) Paragraph 5 of the Court's decision states: 
"In searching for a solution to this crime the 
police learned from LaRae Peterson that the de-
fendant Jean Sinclair had manifest a violent animus 
toward Foster and had made threats upon his life." 
There is no evidence to this effect in the record 
nor any claim of such evidence in the State's brief. 
It is interesting to note that such language does ap-
pear in a publication of "Master Detective Magazine" 
for July of 1963 which was distributed in the Salt 
Lake area during the hearing of the trial in April, 
1963. 
(b) In paragraph 2, page 2, of the opinion, the 
Court states: 
"She was dressed in gray men's pants, had on boots, 
and had a tan trench coat wrapped around the gun." 
This statement is directly from the State's brief, page 
1 L and is a misquotation of the record. Kuehne's 
testimony being at R. 579; 
"She went out to the car and got what I later learned 
was a white trench coat, came back and wrapped the 
.-.-,,-gun 1n 1t. 
Again at R. 584, line 12: 
"a blue parka under a white trench coat" 
both statements by the State's witnesses on the 
State's examination. 
(c) In the first paragraph of page 3, the Court 
sets out as a corroborative circumstance 
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''She was seen driving around in a car with him 
(Kuehne) (to pick a point of vantage to kill 
Foster)." 
There is no such testimony in the record. No wit-
ness claims to have seen defendant in the car with 
Kuehne except Vaughn Humpherys, and Hum-
pherys' testimony concerned only the defendant, 
Kuehne and Humpherys returning from a deer hunt, 
and had nothing to do with Foster. 
(d) In the second paragraph at page 3 of the 
Court's opinion, it is stated: 
"A witness, LaMar B. Williams, who was at the 
Susan Kay Arms apartments testified that shortly 
after midnight he observed a person, whom he de-
scribed as resembling Jean Sinclair, and dressed 
in clothes similar to those she was wearing, in the 
parking area near where Foster was killed, just a 
few minutes before it happened. (This the jury 
could have accepted as placing the defendant at the 
scene of the crime very close to the time it was 
committed.)" 
Again, this is a conclusion unsupported by the 
record. Any fair interpretation of Williams' testimony 
other than the extraction of one line leaves no re-
semblance to the defendant and no similarity of the 
clothes other than the person was dressed in pants 
and a coat. Kuehne's testimony was that she was 
wearing gray flannel pants and a white coat that 
came below her knees, (R. 585). Williams' testimony 
was a light short coat coming between the knees 
and the crotch (R. 981). He could not identify the 
tyPe of <;oat (R. 981)~ 
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In response to the prosecutor's leading ques-
tion, he· stated that he saw someone in the court-
room that resembled the person. He described a 
person with hair on the darker side, wavy in front, 
going straight back (R. 980), a man 165 to 180 pounds 
(R. 983), having a long nose with a cleft chin and 
receding chin line (R. 980). On being confronted by 
Miss Sinclair, he admitted she did not have a cleft 
chin, a receding chin line or dark hair (R. 982), the 
only resemblances claimed. Further, the person was 
seen only through a rear view mirror in the dark 
(R. 979). The area testified to was not in the parking 
lot where Mr. Foster was killed, but almost a block 
to the north, with several large apartment buildings 
between. · 
(e) The Court sets forth in the third paragraph, 
page 3 of the opinion, as follows: 
·•Another witness, Boyd K. Harvey, who was driv-
ing by at the time, heard a shot and saw a person, 
dressed similar to the way defendant was (with a 
trench coat on) run from the apartment into 5th 
North Street carrying an object extending 18 to 24 
inches above he right hand (which could well have 
been the sawed-off shotgun), and get into· a two-
toned car which drove away. (The defendant owned 
a car of this general description.)" 
This statement also is unsupported by the record 
and seems to be a quotation from page 18 of the 
respondent's brief. The only item of apparel describ-
ed by Harvey was "a three-quarter length coat * * just 
above the knees or right at the break of the knees" 
(R. 986). A trench coat was not mentioned. Harvey 
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described the person as being "very agile" and 
"running fast", and as a "burley man about 5' 10" 
with dark hair" (R. 988). The statement regarding the 
car again is an incomplete excerpt from the respon-
dent's brief, including the portion in parentheses. 
Harvey's statement in the record identifies the auto-
mobile as a two-tone Chevrolet automobile, without 
equivocation (R. 989) with the lighter part on the 
bottom (R. 989). The defendant's automobile is a 
Buick station wagon and was so described by half 
a dozen witnesses. 
(f) At paragraph 4 on page 3 of the opinion, 
the Court states: 
"Two neighbors, a Mr. and Mrs. Pieter Combe·e, who 
reside immediately west of the Susan Kay Arms 
Apartments, just after the shooting heard the 
woman, LaRae Peterson, cry out, 'Oh God, she killed 
him'." 
and ignores entirely the testimony of two other of 
the State's witnesses, John Storey (R. 383): "Help, 
he's dead, I know he's dead", and LaRae Peterson 
herself (at R. 803): "Oh my God, he's been shot". It 
is simple for an advocate to pick excerpts from almost 
1700 pages of testimony that appear inculpatory 
standing alone but lose any such inference read in 
context with the entire record. 
It is also interesting to note the Court states that 
the Combees live immediately west of the Susan 
Kay Arms Apartment, while all the evidence in the 
record and the exhibits show the Combees' house to 
be directly south of th~ s~~a,:n Kay apartmE?:nt~ apc;t 
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also south of the area where Foster parked and was 
killed. A small error, surely, but it follows the pat-
tern of repeated failure of the opinion to be support-
ed by the record in a capital case. 
(g) The next succeeding paragraph of the 
opinion states: 
"It was shown that the morning after the killing 
the defendant took a three-quarter length trench 
coat and some slacks, similar to the clothes she was 
wearing that night, which had grease spots and dirt 
on them, to a cleaners. (This connects up with the 
fact that the defendant had to crawl around cars, and 
that there was grease and dirt on her clothing)." 
Three persons (all the State's witnesses) testified 
as to the coat and trousers brought to the cleaners 
with other clothing by Miss Sinclair. It was a coat 
that would come a little below the knee. Mr. Allred, 
the cleaner, testified that it was a full-length coat as 
distinguished from a three-quarter length coat, and 
that Miss Sinclair was charged for cleaning a full-
length coat (R. 1002). All three described a tan whip-
cord coat, while Kuehne's testimony was that the 
coat the defendant was wearing was white. The 
cleaner described the trousers with spot on as "light 
gray pants", while Williams described the trousers 
. on the person he saw as "darker trousers" (R. 980, 
981), and Harvey as "darker than the jacket or coat 
(R. 989). 
(h) The next item claimed to be corroborative 
in the opinion is the sixth paragraph on page 3: 
"There is another fact which may be regarded as 
inculpc..tory: That upon questioning, the defendant 
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denied ever having been at the Susan Kay Arms 
apartments, yet the witness, Gerritadina Combee, 
testified that some few days earlier, about Christmas 
time, she had seen Jean Sinclair, dressed in men's 
clothes, at those apartments in about the same area 
as the killing." 
Reading the record shows the supposed iden tifica-
tion by Mrs. Combee was from a right rear view for 
only several steps. She never saw the face and could 
not describe her clothing or other details (R. 921 ). 
POINT II 
NO SINGLE ITEM OF EVIDENCE SET FORTH 
IN THE OPINION AS CORROBORATIVE WITH THE 
EXCEPTION OF KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY, OR IN 
COMBINATION OF ANY SUCH INCIDENTS, TENDS 
TO CONNECT THE DEFENDANT TO THE HOMI-
CIDE WHEN VIEWED IN THE ABSENCE OF OR 
WITHOUT INTERPRETATION FROM KUEHNE'S 
TESTIMONY. 
Not only does the great weight of case law re-
quire that corroborative testimony tend to connect 
the defendant to the crime in the absence of and 
without interpretation from the testimony of an ac-
complice, but our statute, 77-31-18, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, demands it as is acknowledged by the 
Court at the end of page 3 of the opinion. 
Applying the test of the statute, "unless he is 
corroborated by other evidence which in itself and 
witout the aid of the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission 
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of the offense'', to each item of the evidence set forth 
by the Court in its opinion as being corroborative, it 
cannot be said that any one piece of evidence or 
any combination, viewed in the absence of Kuehne's 
testimony, casts more than a mere suspicion of guilt 
or is more consistent with guilt than with innocence. 
(a) Mrs. Kuene's statement with respect to mak-
ing money fast, in the absence of Kuehne's testi-
mony of offers of money by Sinclair, means nothing. 
(b) The Court's statement that "She was seen 
driving around in a car with him (to pick a point of 
vantage to kill Foster);" is not supported by the rec-
ord in any way. 
(c) LaMar B. Williams' testimony, in the absence 
of Kuehne's testimony regarding clothing, is with-
out meaning or connection with the defendant. See 
Point I, paragraph (d) of this brief. 
(d) The witness Harvey's testimony, without 
Kuehne's testimony as to the clothing and the 
sawed-off shotgun (see Court's ·statement) "(which 
could well have been the sawed-off shotgun)", does 
not tend to connect the defendant in any way with 
the crime. As pointed out in Point I, paragraph (c), 
the statement as to a two-toned car is an excerpt 
from the record, ignoring the rest of the statement 
by Harvey that the car was a Chevrolet. There is no 
evidence of the defendant owning or possessing a 
Chevrolet automobile. It should be pointed out that 
the general description or the person seen by Wil-
liams and Harvey, with the exception of a vague sim-
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ilarity of a light colored coat, described variously, 
does not in any way fit the defendant, and the light 
coat is without meaning in the absence of Kuehne's 
testimony. 
(e) The testimony of the two employees at the 
cleaners and Officer Paul requires interpretation 
from Kuehne's testimony to make any connection 
between the defendant and the crime, i.e. the only 
testimony as to grease and dust spots comes from 
Kuehne and the only testimony as to crawling 
around cars was an extrajudicial statement of the 
defendant allegedly made to Kuehne. 
(f) The statement of Gerritadina Combee iden-
tifying the defendant near the scene of the crime 
some two weeks prior to the crime is again an ex-
cerpt from the record and is not borne out by the 
balance of Mrs. Combee's testimony. Also see State 
v. Sommers. 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273, holding that 
presence in the vicinity of a·crime not at the time of 
its commission is not sufficient to corroborate. 
(g) The Court also indicates at pages 2 and 3 
of the opinion that there is evidence from witnesses 
other than Kuehne "bearing out the facts concerning 
defendant's unnatural relationship with LaRae Peter-
son; that she had such an impassioned attachment 
to her and resentment of Foster that she wanted to 
resort to fiendish violence to get rid of his rivalry 
for her favors". This again is an inference unsup-
ported by the record. All Kuehne's testimony point-
ed to a concern for the child Cheryl Ann, rather than 
an unnatural relationship with LaRae Peterson, and 
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the State's other witnesses concerning the alleged 
attachment brought a direct denial from LaRae Peter-
son, and State's witness Vaughn Humpherys testi-
fied that in all the years he had known them (LaRae 
Peterson and Jean Sinclair) he had never seen any-
thing he considered improper between them (R. 750). 
His entire testimony was to the effect that the de-
fendant's concern was over the child (R. 719 to 765). 
While it is true that LaRae Peterson refused to 
answer concerning certain questions as to homo-
sexuality, this Court in reviewing the same facts 
held these questions were not relevant. The matter 
of the contempt of LaRae Peterson, 386 P.2d 727, 
dated November 21, 1963. 
It is a simple matter in more than 1600 pages of 
record to take statements or phrases out of context 
which reflect an indication of guilt or innocence 
when not considered with all the evidence. It is our 
contention that the examples or incidents set forth 
by the Court as being corroborative are not a fair 
c~Jnsideration of the testimony. 
POINT III 
THIS OPINION IF ALLOWED TO STAND AS 
WRITTEN WOULD CHANGE THE ENTIRE LAW OF 
CORROBORATION OF AN ACCOMPLICE IN THIS 
STATE AND WOULD ABROGATE THE PROVI-
SIONS OF 77-31-18, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953. 
The law is well settled in this State regarding 
corroborative evidence both by statute and by case 
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law, see cases cited at pages 53 and 54 of appellant's 
brief in the instant case. The cases over the nation, 
almost without exception, hold that the connection 
by the evidence in order to make it corroborative 
must be "in the absence of and without interpreta-
tion from the testimony of an accomplice." The 
Court herein cites the statute and then chooses to 
ignore the statute. Probably the best example that 
can be given is that used by the Court at page '4 
concerning a witness seeing X coming from the 
woods. It is apparent in the example that there was 
corroborative evidence and the facts set forth make 
a prima facie case without reference to an accom-
plice in any way. This cannot be considered an 
analogy to the present case. May it be noted that 
in the Court's opinion in many of the examples the 
Court sets forth in parentheses that the evidence 
tends to corroborate with Kuehne's testimony as to 
various items, i.e. the offers of money, the clothes 
Kuehne says Sinclair was wearing, Kuehne's state-
ment that he sawed off a shotgun; but this is not 
the test set forth by either case law in this State or 
by statute, the test being that the evidence tends to 
connect the defendant to the crime in the absence 
of the testimony of the accomplice. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT ON NOVEMBER 21, 1963, HELD 
THAT QUESTIONS AS TO LESBIAN AND HOMO-
SEXUALITY AS TO LARAE PETERSON WERE IM-
MATERIAL, AND YET FAILED TO CONSIDER THIS 
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HOLDING IN VIEW OF APPELLANT'S POINT XIV 
IN HER INITIAL BRIEF. 
The Court on November 21, 1963 in the case 
of In re Peterson, supra, arising directly from facts 
in this case, held that the questions asked LaRae 
Peterson with regard to homosexual relations were 
not relevant and were not an issue in the case (see 
386 P.2d, page 727), yet the Court in its opinion ig-
nores appellant's claim of error in the trial Court's 
overruling the appellant's objections to the same 
questions as being ambiguous, immaterial and ir-
relevant. In view of the statements in the opinion 
heretofore set forth regarding the unnatural rela-
tionship between Peterson and Sinclair, Sinclair's 
"violent animus" and desire to resort to "fiendish. 
violence", it can hardly be said that allowing such 
questions, even without answer, or more cogently, 
expressly without answer, was not highly prejudi-
cial to the defendant. 
POINT V 
THE COURT IGNORED AS WITHOUT MERIT 
SEVERAL POINTS OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WHICH 
ARE DIRECTLY SUPPORTED BY CASE LAW FROM 
THIS COURT. 
(a) The Court brushed off some thirteen points 
of the defendant's as being without merit and with-
out discussion thereof. Among these were several 
jury incidents ,including the shaking hands and con-
versation between witness Gerritadina Combee and 
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jury foreman Firmage which is so on all fours with 
the Utah case of State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, that it 
is difficult to see how it can be ignored. In addition 
thereto, the Court's refusal to allow an examination 
into Kuehne's psychiatric background in view of his 
relationship to the trial seems to be against the great 
weight of authority as to the scope of credibility in 
cross examination. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the 
matters above set forth which we feel are complete-
ly supported by the record and especially in view 
of the sensational nature of the case and the fact 
that the case is a capital crime, the defendant should 
be granted a rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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